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VOTING CHANCES INSTEAD OF VOTING 
WEIGHTS* 
Paolo Di Giannatale**, Francesco Passarelli***  
Abstract  
We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is 
disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate 
both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot 
prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less 
severe if partners can leave the union at low cost. We propose an alternative voting method 
based on random assignments of voting rights. Agents are given chances to vote instead of 
weights. If chances are computed according to a specific formula, no political distortion occurs. 
As an application, we analyze the rotation voting system recently adopted by the European 
Central Bank. We find that this system yields an enormous amount of political distortion. Then 
we compute the voting chances that should be assigned to Eurozone countries in order to 
eliminate it.  
1. Introduction 
Voting is probably the most common way to make collective decisions and tensions amongst 
partners are normal when there are opinion differences about what to do. Nonetheless one 
would expect lower tensions when voting rules are fair. A common idea is that voting rules, 
such as majority threshold and vote weighting, can be chosen in order to guarantee enough 
representation for the majority and sufficient protection for the minority. But how can we really 
judge the fairness of a voting system? Can weighted votes and super-majorities guarantee 
fairness? 
These are old questions that we approach in the following perspective. Any common project 
among partners produces a certain amount of payoffs. Partners can be States in a federal 
context, factions in legislatures or boards, ethnic groups, companies in a joint venture, and so 
on. By common project we mean any kind of cooperation that yields a positive value, such as 
building a public infrastructure, implementing a common policy, launching a new product, etc.                  
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The value has to be split among partners. We consider two alternatives. First, the partners reach 
an agreement on payoff division through a negotiation process that we call “economic 
bargaining”, in which bargaining power only derives from the way partners contribute to the 
payoff production. Second, the partners split the payoffs through a decision made by voting, in 
which power is given by voting rules, that define the way the partners contribute to the decision. 
We name the second alternative “political bargaining”. We model the economic and the 
political bargaining as two games in coalitional form. Then we apply the same solution concept, 
the Shapley value, to these two games and compare the solutions. If they are different, then a 
certain amount of “political distortion” in payoff division occurs. Thus there might be situations 
in which a player gets a lot, not because he contributes a lot, but just because he has got a lot of 
voting rights. 
One may conclude that too much distortion means unfair voting rules. But we do not take the 
avenue of analyzing how much distortion is tolerable in a fair voting system. We rather address 
three different questions, one positive and two normative. First, we want to see if, in the class of 
weighted voting games, it is always possible to set up a weight apportionment and a majority 
threshold that yield no distortion. The answer is “No”. This class is too limited because weights 
are a discrete tool of power assignment. In other words, for a large mass of economic games, the 
solution cannot be replicated by a weighted voting game. Thus a certain amount of distortion, 
and possibly unfairness, is unavoidable. 
Second, we study how political distortions are related to the players’ chance of leaving the 
political group. We find that foreseeing a secession clause or a breakdown scenario among the 
constitutional or statutory provisions may reduce political distortions substantially. Notice that 
distortions do not decrease when secession occurs, but when secession becomes a viable 
alternative, a credible threat. This possibly explains why the European Union has introduced a 
secession clause in the recently adopted Lisbon Treaty. 
Finally, we look for an alternative voting method that yields zero distortion. Instead of a 
certain amount of votes, a partner is given a chance of being selected for a one-vote right. For 
example, partner a  is not assigned, say, 3  votes, but rather he has, say, 47%  probability of 
being selected for voting; partner b  has, say, 29%  probability of being selected, instead of 2  
votes.... Chances are a continuous tool of power assignment. Thus, for any economic game, it is 
always possible to find a distribution of selection probabilities such that expected political 
distortion is zero. We show how to compute these probabilities. 
The random assignment of vote rights proposed here is not the unique mechanism that 
eliminates political distortions. However, we think that it is not so distant from what in reality 
happens in some international institutions like the IMF or the UN Security Council. Most 
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countries do not have a permanent right to vote. Some of them are appointed as non-permanent 
members. Similarly, the European Central Bank has recently decided to adopt a new voting 
system in which governors of different countries are assigned the right to vote according to a 
rotation mechanism. The rotation speed depends on each country’s economic relevance. In the 
last part of the paper, as an application, we measure the amount of distortion that this new 
system would produce. The picture is not encouraging: distortions are quite large, despite the 
reform. Then we show how an alternative distortion-free system based on random selection 
should be crafted. 
We suggest that random selection is better than rotation or appointment, and possibly not too 
difficult to implement in practice. It should be adopted not only in supranational bodies, but in a 
wider range of situations, such as federal systems or boards. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basics on the Shapley-Shubik 
( SS ) index and surveys the related literature. Section 3 illustrates the basic approach and 
analyzes the sources of political distortion. Section 4 explores the role of outside options in the 
political bargaining. In Section 5 we present the voting rule based on random selection and 
show how it can be applied to specific contexts or how to use it for drafting a constitution. 
Section 6 applies our findings to the Council of Governors of the ECB while Section 7 
concludes. All proofs are in Appendix. 
2. Preliminaries and related literature 
Our exercise amounts to analyzing the distortion that occurs when bargaining in a general 
negotiation context, such as the market, is replaced by bargaining in a voting context, such as a 
legislature. As pointed out earlier, since we want to focus only on the difference between 
economic and political game, not on the differences in the way we solve them, we use a 
common solution concept. We use the Shapley value to solve both bargaining games (Shapley, 
1953). This solution is fully axiomatic and does not require any specific or contingent 
description of how negotiations take place. Moreover, it is based on a parsimonious set of 
axioms that can be given a normative reading in terms of fairness.1 
Nonetheless, how the sub-coalitions form, whether they are stable, etc. are essential 
ingredients of the underlying bargaining games. We will come back to this point in Section 4. 
We will see that the way political and economic game interact is crucially determined by the 
availability of outside options and, ultimately, by the cost of leaving the political group. 
The Shapley solution of a voting game is the Shapley-Shubik ( SS ) power index (Shapley & 
Shubik, 1954).2 L. Shapley and M. Shubik claim that their power measure is “ineluctable” since 
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“any scheme for imputing power among the members of a committee system either yields the 
power index defined above or leads to a logical inconsistency” (Shapley & Shubik, 1954, p. 
789). 
Still a question remains: is political power a measure of a player’s expected worth? Roth 
(1988a) shows how the Shapley value can be interpreted as an expected utility function and 
Laruelle & Valenciano (2003) provide an axiomatic foundation of this view. Moreover, 
Felsenthal & Machover (1998) point out that the SS  index, being derived from a solution of a 
cooperative game, corresponds to a notion of “voting power as expected share in fixed total 
prize” (p. xiii). Roth (1988b) suggests the possibility that voting power and bargaining solution 
may be different, but only “when we are interpreting a simple game as something other than a 
transferable utility characteristic function game” (p. 8). Thus, the answer to the question above 
is “Yes” at least when there is a mean to transfer utility, like side-payments. In this case the 
value of one player’s votes is his SS  index. This implies that a risk-neutral voter is indifferent 
between voting, with the prospect of getting his SS  value, and by-passing voting if he is 
offered SS . In accordance with this literature, we claim that a player’s SS  index is not only a 
measure of his voting power, but also of the monetary value that he expects from playing a 
voting game.3 Nevertheless, a proportional agents’ representation in voting does not ensure a 
proportional power: rather, this latter requires a non-proportional distribution of voting weights, 
as justified by Laslier (2012). 
Our main normative point in this paper is that political distortions can be reduced or avoided 
either by allowing for secession or by using probabilities of being selected for vote. As regards 
the role of a secession clause, to the best of our knowledge, no work has been done so far. As 
for the use of probabilities, Berg & Holler (1986) propose to randomize the qualified majority 
threshold as a means to avoid discrepancy between the seat distribution in a committee and an 
exogenous distribution of voting power. This idea is also present in Turnovec (2009). Unlike 
both of these works, we specifically analyze differences between economic and political power, 
and we study how the randomization mechanism should be computed based on the economic 
game played by the agents. Moreover, we explore the level of centralization of the political 
union by considering outside options in the political game. 
Our work is related to another relevant body of literature which has investigated qualified 
majority and voting apportionments from a normative viewpoint. Laruelle & Valenciano (2004) 
characterize axiomatically the fairness properties of power indices. Choosing a power index 
entails choosing a measure of inequality. Fairness is also the main concern of Leech (2002), 
who proposes an algorithm to compute the weights and the majority threshold that equalize per-
capita voting power of each member state in the EU Council. Casella (2005) suggests that the 
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possibility of “storing” votes improves allocation when players have heterogeneous policy 
preferences. Casella et al. (2010) test this hypothesis. Alesina & Passarelli (2010) suggest that 
rules are optimal if they assign the pivotal role to the voter whose interests are similar to the 
social planner’s ones. Instead, other authors prefer to use different measures of power. 
Aleskerov (2008), for instance, uses new power indices to examine the power distribution in the 
Russian parliament, while in Breton et al. (2012) the concept of nucleolus is applied to the EU 
council of ministers. These works are mainly concerned with efficiency issues, and they stick to 
“traditional” voting methods, such as weighted voting and super-majority rules. 
In the present paper we focus on distributional problems, and our proposal of a 
randomization scheme somehow breaks with this tradition. The random selection of voters has 
recently become a popular topic of the law literature. The main concern is representation and 
fairness in general elections. López-Guerra (2011) claims that if voters are randomly selected to 
cast their ballots, and they get well informed about the candidates, the quality of electoral 
outcomes improves with respect to universal suffrage. Other authors propose lottery voting, a 
system in which the winner representative is randomly drawn from a distribution that reflects 
how citizens have cast their votes (Amar, 1984). This system would guarantee better 
representation of the minorities and more turnout (Sewell et al., 2009). We share with this 
literature the basic idea that randomizing vote rights can improve fairness. We differ from it in 
the way random assignments of vote rights are derived. We do not look at the way citizens cast 
their votes but, more fundamentally, at the way citizens’ interests are reflected by the payoff 
division in the economic game. Finally, our approach is perhaps more general and applies also 
to non-political committees. 
3. Setup 
3.1 The economic game 
Consider a set { }nN 1,..,=  of players and denote with N2  the set of all possible subsets 
(coalitions) of N . Let [ ]0,12: →Nγ  be the characteristic function which assigns a worth 
)(Sγ  to any coalition NS ⊆ . One may interpret )(Sγ  as the maximum payoff achievable by 
using the resources of the players in any coalition S . 
Let ),( γN  be a transferable-utility (TU) convex game, and call it the economic game.4 The 
economic game is solved by using the Shapley solution { })(),...,(=)( 1 γϕγϕγϕ n , where  
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i γγϕ ∆⋅≡ ∑
⊆         (1) 
with 
!
1)!(!=)(
n
snsSp −− , )()(=)( SiSSi γγγ −∪∆ , Ss = , and ni 1,..,= . Observe that 
)(Siγ∆  is player i ’s marginal contribution to coalition S  and )(Sp  can be considered as the 
probability of S , with the underlying idea that all players’ orderings are equally likely 
(symmetry). Thus any player expects to be rewarded her expected marginal contribution to the 
random coalition S . Observe also that ( )Ni
Ni
γγϕ =)(∑∈  (efficiency). To the sake of 
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that 1=)(Nγ . 
The interpretation is that, had the payers to bargain into the market for the division of the 
unit-payoff of an economic project, a likely and fair division would assign each player i  a share 
)(γϕi . Below we sometimes call )(γϕi  the economic solution in order to contrast it with the 
political solution described in the following Section. 
3.2 The voting game 
Consider the same set N  of players. Let ),( vN  be a TU game and call it voting game, 
where { }0,12: →Nv  is a simple characteristic function describing a voting situation as 
follows:  
⎩⎨
⎧
loosing is  if0
 winningis  if1
=)(
S
S
Sv
 
Solving the voting game with the Shapley value in (1) yields the Shapley-Shubik power 
index, SS :  
)()()(
\
SvSpv i
iNS
i ∆⋅≡ ∑
⊆
φ
        (2) 
where )(Sp  is the same as in (1). Let us interpret )(Sv  as a usual characteristic function of a 
TU game: )(Sv  represents the payoff, normalized to one, that originates from the political 
decision made by the members of coalition S . Reaching a majority is the only way to make this 
decision; and the decision is the only way to produce the payoff. What is relevant in the political 
game is forming a majority. The pivot is the voter who swings a coalition from loosing to 
winning. His vote’s worth is the full amount of the payoff. Any voter is rewarded by his chance 
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to play a pivotal role. In fact, )(viφ  in (2) represents voter i ’s probability to end up in a pivotal 
situation. Since utility is transferable, )(viφ  may be assigned through monetary side-payments. 
Voting games are weighted when voters are assigned a different amount of votes. Sometimes 
a qualified majority is required. If it is the case, the voting game is usually represented with 
),..,;(= 1 nwwqv , where q  denotes the majority threshold and iw  is player i ’s number of 
votes (i.e. weight). 
3.3 Political distortions 
Assume that players cannot play the economic game without having formed a majority in the 
voting game. This reflects many real situations in which partners (States, provinces, regions, 
political factions, groups in corporations,...) engage in a common project after having voted in 
committees or legislatures. Realistically, the decision in the voting game also specifies how the 
payoffs of an economic project will be distributed; i.e. the bill to be voted sounds like: “Let 
)(Nγ  be produced and let it be distributed as specified in the present bill”. In this case, the 
distributional provisions of the bill become the object of a “political bargaining” amongst 
voters, and side payments which allow payoffs to be apportioned among players are possibly 
also included into the bill. In a way, political bargaining “replaces” economic bargaining, and 
political power substitutes economic power.5 Therefore voting rules rather than economic roles 
determine how payoffs are distributed. For example, a player that is rather unimportant in the 
economic game can get a lot if he is quite powerful in the political game. This causes what we 
call here a political distortion, i.e. a discrepancy between political and economic power which 
affects the payoff allocation. We measure the political distortion with the difference between the 
Shapley value of the political game (i.e. the SS  index) and the Shapley value of the economic 
game. 
 
Definition 1. Call PD  (Political Distortion) the difference between the Shapley-Shubik 
index of the political game and the Shapley value of the economic game:  
)()(=),( γϕφγ −vvPD  
For player i , 
[ ].)()()(=)()(=),(
\
SSvSpvvPD ii
iNS
iii γγϕφγ ∆−∆⋅− ∑
⊆
    (3) 
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iPD  represents the additional gain (the loss, if negative) that player i  enjoys when the payoff 
allocation is made within a political context instead of an economic contest, like the market. 
This gain can be very large if player i  has much more political power than economic power. 
Since both )(viφ  and )(γϕi  sum up to one, then 0=),( vPDiN γ∑ . This means that the 
iPD ’s represent pure redistributions amongst players, to the exclusive advantage of the players 
which are more politically than economically powerful. Let us see this point with an example. 
 
Example 1. Consider an economic game ),( 1γN  which consists of an agreement on the 
realization of a common infrastructure (an airport, a power plant, an oil pipeline,..) amongst 
the three States of a federal country ),,( cba . Suppose that their economies have different size 
and characteristics so that their contributions to the creation of a common value are different. 
Let the characteristic function of this economic game be the following: 0=)(1 ∅γ , 
0.3=)(1 aγ , 0.1=)(1 bγ , 0.2=)(1 cγ , 0.5=),(1 baγ , 0.6=),(1 caγ , 0.4=),(1 cbγ , 
1=),,(1 cbaγ . For example, state a  is big and could build a rather large infrastructure that 
worths 0.3=)(1 aγ . Of course, it would make a larger one, which worths 0.5 , if also state b  
participates, .0.5=),(1 baγ  The Shapley value for this game is: { }0.33 0.23, 0.43,=)( 1γϕ  
and reflects the players’ expected contributions to the common value. For example, state a , the 
largest contributor, gets the largest share. Reasonably, this solution would be achieved if the 
three countries could negotiate in a market context.  
Suppose that the agreement can be implemented only if there is a formal decision made by 
simple majority, in which every country has one vote. In this case, the political game is 
(2;1,1,1)=1v . The SS  solution is { }0.33 0.33, 0.33,=)( 1vφ . Since all countries count the 
same in the political game, they expect to be rewarded the same for casting their vote. 
Therefore, the vector of political distortions is { }0.1,0 0.1,=),( 11 +−γvPD . Thus player a  
suffers a loss from having less political power than economic power. On the contrary, the 
economically weak country b  takes advantage from being equally important as the other 
players in the political decision. In some sense, 0.1=),( 11 −γvPDa  represents a transfer made 
by a  to b  for having b  taking part in the joint political decision.  
 
Example 1 illustrates that political distortions may be large when voting weights do not 
reflect economic power. As pointed out earlier, an important assumption so far is that a 
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common political decision is the only way to realize the common project. The partners by no 
means can undertake even a small part of the project without the permission of the majority. In 
our example, this entails a high level of centralization, which is in fact what realistically 
happens when some policy areas are exclusive competence of the central government (energy 
policy, infrastructures/environment, monetary policy, defence, foreign policy,...).6 Thanks to 
this assumption, the political game can be described with a simple characteristic function. 
Players have no outside option and the solution is the Shapley Shubik index. In case the partners 
have the option to quit the group and undertake the project by their own, the political game is no 
longer simple. We come back to this point in Section 4, where we show that things may change 
substantially. 
We wonder now if there is any chance to eliminate political distortions by using appropriate 
weights and majority thresholds. The question is: given an economic game, is it always possible 
to find a weighted voting game with the same solution? In this case, the iPD ’s would be zero 
for all players. The answer to this question is “No”. There is a class of economic games, which 
we show is a huge one, whose solutions cannot be replicated by the solution of any (possibly 
weighted) voting game. For economic games in this class, a certain amount of political 
distortion is unavoidable. Take game ),( 1γN  of example 1. a ’s weight is possibly too low. 
However, it is impossible to find a weight apportionment and a majority threshold such that 
0.43=aφ . The reason is that with three players the class of SS  solutions of all possible 
weighted voting games is relatively small and it does not include 0.43, whereas the class of the 
economic games’ solutions is an infinite set, dense in [ ]0,1  (see Figure 1 below). 
Proposition 1. Let Γ  be the set of all TU economic games ),( γN  and let Σ  be the set of all 
voting games. For any Ni∈ , i) the set of all Shapley values { }Γ∈),(:)( γγϕ Ni  is a dense 
subset of [ ]0,1 ; ii) the set of SS  values { }Σ∈),(:)( vNviφ  is a non-dense subset of [ ]0,1 .  
The idea from proposition 1 is that voting games are unable to yield all allocations that for 
example a market may guarantee. The class of political solutions is too little: the economic 
value of a player can be any point in [ ]0,1 , whereas the space of all political solutions (i.e. the 
set of all SS  indices for that player) is only a discrete collection of points in the unit interval. In 
other words, the set of political solutions has “holes” in that interval. If the economic solution is 
in one of those holes, there is political distortion. Thus a player’s value of playing an economic 
game is different from his value of playing a political game. 
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This is the case of player a  (and b ) in game 1γ  of example 1. Figure 1 offers a graphical 
representation of the distortion suffered by player a  (which amounts to 0.1=),( 11 −γvPDa ) if 
the political game 1v  is adopted. The bullet points represent the political solutions of other 
possible voting games. With three players the set of all SS  solutions consists of six bullet 
points “only”: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ΣΨ ,1
3
2,
2
1,
3
1,
6
10,=)(i .
7 For example, a voting game like (5;3,1,2)=2v  with 
more “proportionate” weights would grant player a  with 1/2=)( 2vaφ . However, still a certain 
amount of political distortion occurs also in this case. 
 
 
Figure 1: Political Distorsions with three players. 
 
An economic solution can be any point in the unit interval, whereas a political solution 
belongs only to a limited set of points. This means that political distortions are quite likely in 
reality. Choosing weights that better reflect economic power may reduce distortions in many 
cases, but they might not eliminate distortions completely. As we have seen, with 2v  the 
political distortion suffered by a  is lower but it is still positive. 
3.3.1 Games with many players 
One would expect that the gap between an economic solution and the closest political 
solution is decreasing in the number of players. This is in fact what happens. In the limit, the set 
of the political solutions is the interval [ ]0,1 , then it coincides with the set of the economic 
solutions. 
Proposition 2. As ∞→n , )()( ΓΨ→ΣΨ ii .  
This means that, when the number of players is infinite, for any economic game Γ∈γ  it is 
possible to find a weighted voting game Σ∈)(γv  such that each player receives the same 
payoffs from the two games. Put differently, with a larger number of players there are more 
chances of finding a weight apportionment with small political distortion. The reason is that as 
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the number of players increases the set of the political solutions (the set of bullet points) 
becomes less and less coarse. This leads to the conclusion that political distortion induced by 
weighted voting is a relevant problem in situations with a fairly small number of players. Vice 
versa, if correctly chosen, weighted votes are effective when applied to large committees or 
boards. Somehow paradoxically, in reality we observe the opposite: a limited use of weights in 
situations where the number of voters involved is quite large. 
4. Outside options 
So far we have assumed that partners have no outside options in the political game. Minority 
groups cannot undertake smaller projects by their own initiative nor they can disobey the will of 
the majority and step out of the project. The decision about the project can be taken only 
through a centralized political process. This legitimates the use of simple characteristic 
functions for describing weighted voting: majority coalitions yield the full payoff and minority 
coalitions get zero. No coalition, apart from a winning one, can produce any payoff. 
The underlying notion of political union is rather rigid. It corresponds to a high level of 
centralization in which given decisional areas are exclusive competence of the political 
institution (States, federal systems, boards in companies,...). This is compatible with the 
traditional concept of sovereign state, in which the state itself is indivisible and it does not give 
up any of its components (e.g. territories, competencies, etc.). This usually applies also to 
confederate and federal unions which do not allow for secession rights, although there are few 
examples in which such rights are recognized, at least formally (e.g. Canada or former 
Jugoslavia). 
What would one expect with a lower level of centralization, such that partners can subtract 
themselves from the majority’s will? Is political distortion still there? We find that if 
centralization decreases, also the political distortion decreases and it can even disappear in a 
totally decentralized political scenario. The reason is that partners have outside options. They 
can undertake projects by their own and get a positive payoff. 
Suppose that partners have the option of realizing the project unilaterally (or together with 
sub-groups of agents). In this event, however, they bear a “political cost”. We interpret this cost 
as consisting in a fine that they must pay to the members that remain with the union. Let’s 
assume that this payment is proportional to the payoff of the unilateral project. For example, if 
doing the project by myself yields 0.3 , I have to pay 0.3)(1 ⋅−α  of political cost and I get 
0.3⋅α  as net payoff.8 We claim that if α  lowers down to zero, the political distortion 
decreases until it disappears. Let us see this with our three States example. 
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Example 2. Take the economic game ),( 1γN  and assume that the States have the option to 
leave the union and pay a “fine” which is a share )(1 α−  of their payoffs. Call ),( 2vN  the 
“new” political game. The characteristic function is the following.  
• v2(Ø) = 0.  
• Single players get economic payoffs minus the fine: v2(a) = αγ1(a) = α·0.3; v2(b) = 
α·0.1; v2(c) = α·0.2. 
• Two-state coalitions get the economic payoff plus the fine paid by the player who has 
left the union: v2(a,b) = γ1(a,b) + (1 - α) γ1(c) = 0.5 + (1 - α)·0.2; v
2(a,c) = 0.6 + (1 - 
α)·0.1; v2(b,c) = 0.4 + (1 - α)·0.3.  
• Finally, v2(a,b,c) = 1.  
The Shapley solution for this political game is: 
0.10.33=)( 2 ⋅+αφ va  
0.10.33=)( 2 ⋅−αφ vb  
0.33=)( 2vcφ  
Interestingly, as soon as the fine for leaving the union approaches zero (i.e. 1→α ), the 
political payoffs converge to the economic payoffs: the political distortion disappears (i.e. 
→)( 2vφ  )( 1γϕ ).  
 
The intuition is clear. If leaving the union is cheap, the partners in the minority are simply 
better off not participating. Outside options cannot be ignored in the political bargaining. As a 
result, the political game subsumes the underlying economic bargaining game. 
Proposition 3. As 1→α , 0),( →γvPDi  for all i . The political distortion is positively 
related to the cost of leaving the political union.  
This model predicts that political distortions due to majority voting are an issue whenever 
breaking (by leaving the group or not adhering to the majority will) is a costly option. 
Interestingly, when the cost is zero, players’ threats of doing things by their own affect the 
political bargaining in the same way as they would affect the economic bargaining. 
If any player has an incentive to pay the fine and do the project by himself, the others leave 
him at least with his net stand-alone payoffs. The outcome is that nobody leaves the union, the 
project is realized and no Pareto inefficiency occurs. Therefore, allowing for a “secession 
clause” into a constitution mitigates the effects of voting rights malapportionments and lowers 
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the potential for internal distributive conflicts. This possibly explains why the possibility of 
leaving the European Union by any member country has been explicitly introduced in the 
recently adopted Lisbon Treaty. 
We have modeled the cost of not adhering to the majority’s decision as a purely 
redistributive mechanism based on fines. No inefficiency occurs. This is consistent, for 
example, with the rules of the Stability Pact of the European Monetary Union.9 One might 
alternatively think that sticking with the union is a “money burning” mechanism, like in the case 
of a secession war. The union generates collective losses which may imperil the project and lead 
to the breakup of the union itself.10 Exploring this kind of inefficiency is beyond the scope of 
this paper. We leave it for future extensions. 
5. The random selection of voters 
So far we have followed a positive approach. We have shown that, given an economic game, 
unless the number of players is infinitely large, it may be impossible to find a voting rule based 
on qualified majority and weighted votes which reduces political distortions to zero. We have 
also shown that allowing for a secession clause mitigates the effect of political distortions. 
Hereafter we take a normative perspective, in which we suggest a different voting method that, 
for any economic game, eliminates political distortion. With this method agents are randomly 
selected, with given probabilities, to take part in a group that will make the political decision by 
simple majority. 
Political distortions have been defined above as the difference between the expected value of 
playing the political game (i.e. the Shapley Shubik index) and the expected value of playing the 
economic one (the Shapley value). The problem is that when the political game is a weighted 
majority voting the two payoffs do not always coincide. Intuitively, this problem arises because 
weighted voting is a discrete method for generating political power. Our aim here is finding a 
continuous method; i.e. a voting method whose expected payoff can be any real number. The 
idea is giving “chances” to participate in voting rather than “weights”. Let us illustrate this 
method by following up example 1. 
 
Example 3. We want a voting method, call it )( 1γrv , whose Shapley-Shubik index is 
{ }0.33 0.23, 0.43,=))(( 1γφ rv . Let us describe rv  as follows: “the way payoffs are shared will 
be decided with probability 10%  by a  alone; with probability 20%  by a  and c ; with 
probability 70%  by a , b and c  in simple majority voting”. It is easy to see that for this voting 
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game a ’s expected payoff is 0.43=1/370%1/220%110%=))(( 1 ⋅+⋅+⋅γφ ra v . Similarly, 
0.23=1/370%=))(( 1 ⋅γφ rb v , and 0.33=))(( 1γφ rc v . No political distortion occurs.  
 
One possible description of the voters’ random selection is that one ball is drawn from a box 
that contains 10%  blue balls, 20%  green balls and 70%  red balls. Blue means that only a  
will vote; green means that a  and c  will vote; red means that all players will vote. The idea in 
example 3 is that rational risk-neutral agents are indifferent between being selected for voting, 
with the risk of getting low or high payoffs, and agreeing in advance on a division that reflects 
their expected SS  values. For example, player c  is indifferent between getting 0.33  in 
advance and accepting the random selection with 10%  chance of getting nothing, 20%  chance 
of getting 1/2  and 70%  chance of getting 1/3 . All players split the available wealth in the 
same way as they would have split it into the market. 
A key role in this voting method is played by the chance of being selected for the voting 
game. We will show that for any economic game it is possible to find a “chance allocation” 
such that political distortions are zero. Let us first describe how to compute these chances for a 
generic economic game. Then we define the Random Selection Voting Rule ( RSVR ). Finally 
we show that no political distortions occur if the RSVR  is adopted. 
Consider the economic game ),( γN , and its Shapley solution )(γϕ . Re-label the players 
following the decreasing order of their Shapley values: player 1 is the one with the largest 
Shapley value (player a  in the example); player 2  is the next one ( c  in the example), and so 
on: 
.)(...)()( 21 γϕγϕγϕ n≥≥≥         (4) 
Players are listed in terms of their economic relevance in γ , as measured by the Shapley 
value. Call mυ , ( nm 1,..,= ) the simple majority game that includes the first m  players in the 
Shapley value ranking (from 1 to m ). We have n  simple majority voting games. Player 1 has 
the chance to vote in games nυυυ ,...,, 21 ; he always votes. Player 2  participates in one of 
games nυυυ ,...,, 32 , but not in 1υ ; ... player n  has only the chance to participate in nυ  
together with all the other players:  
Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli:  Voting chances instead of voting weights 
  15
Simple majority games
Players 1 2  n−1 n
1 ∙ ∙  ∙ ∙
2 ∙  ∙ ∙
   
n − 1 ∙ ∙
n ∙
 
 
The “chance allocation” amounts to generating a probability distribution over the set of the 
mυ  games ( nm 1,..,= ). 
 
Definition 2. An RSVR  for ),( γN  is a probability distribution over the set of mυ  such that  
( ) [ ][ ]⎩⎨
⎧
⋅
−−⋅ +
nmm
nmm
m
mmm
=for   )(
11,..,=for   )()(
=Pr 1γϕ
γϕγϕυ      (5) 
 
In words, an RSVR  is a voting rule by which voters are randomly selected to participate in a 
committee that decides by simple majority. A committee of m  members includes the m  most 
economically relevant players. The probability of forming that committee is computed 
according to (5). 
Our main point is the following. 
Proposition 4 For any economic game ),( γN , no political distortions occur if the political 
game is based on the RSVR  defined above.  
 
What is relevant here is not weighted votes but probabilities to participate in voting. Players 
with more economic power are assigned higher probability. If probabilities are computed 
correctly, then players expect from the voting game exactly what they would expect from the 
political game. This voting method replicates the outcome that would be produced by a market 
mechanism in which players’ bargaining power only derives from their relevance in the 
economic game.11 
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Proposition 4 may be interpreted in a large number perspective, where the jx ’s are 
frequencies rather than probabilities. Suppose the economic game ),( γN  is repeated many 
times. At any time there will be a different subset of players selected to make the political 
decision. Reasonably, the selected players will split the payoff equally among themselves, 
leaving the others with zero. After a large number of times, the total SS  payoffs of any player 
will approximate the total Shapley values of the economic games. 
Notice that the RSVR  proposed here is not the unique mechanism which eliminates political 
distortions. What makes it desirable and possibly easy to implement in real situations is 
simplicity and fairness. As pointed out earlier, random selection is not observed in reality. There 
are cases in which players accept to rotate in voting (e.g. ECB). In other cases, differently sized 
groups of players select one representative which may or may not have weighted votes (e.g. 
IMF or the UN Security Council). Both rotation speed and selection of representatives are 
discrete mechanisms which (partially) eliminate distortions only if the game is repeated a large 
number of times. With an RSVR  expected distortions can be made arbitrarily small even for 
economic games which are played a limited number of times. 
5.1 The constitutional perspective 
So far we have implicitly assumed that the regulator which has the power to enforce the 
voting rule has also a precise knowledge of the economic game. In fact, in a typical 
“constitutional” perspective the regulator has the power to establish the rules or voting protocol 
but it has no concise knowledge of the worth attainable to each coalition. Moreover, the voting 
protocol cannot be changed any time partners play a different economic game. What can be said 
in this case? Suppose that the regulator has to write a single voting rule for a long-term 
partnership amongst different agents. Examples are treaties of supranational institution, 
constitutions of federal unions, or even statutory provisions for merging companies or joint 
ventures. The regulator ignores all future economic games, but it may know the game that will 
be played “on average”. If the RSVR  is computed on this average game, distortions will be 
eliminated “on average”. 
Proposition 5 Let { }),(),...,,( 1 tNN γγ  be a set of t  economic games played by the agents in 
N . Call ),( γN  the average game of this set, where, for any ,2NS∈  )(1=)(
1=
S
t
S j
t
j
γγ ∑ . 
The average political distortion is zero if the payoffs of each game in the set are split using the 
RSVR  based on the average game. 
 
Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli:  Voting chances instead of voting weights 
  17
This proposition amounts to saying that in the long run total political distortion is zero if the 
selection probabilities of the RSVR  are set by looking at the average game )(Sγ . 
Let us see more specifically how )(Sγ  and the selection probabilities should be computed 
in this constitutional perspective. The Social Planner ignores the different roles that players will 
have in future economic games, but assume it can identify, for any player i , some measure of 
his economic relevance, iP . If no information is available about future economic projects it is 
natural to expect that each player’s contribution is proportional to his economic relevance. 
Examples of economic relevance are population, GDP, capital endowments, natural resources, 
stock shares in the company,... or appropriate convex combinations of these measures. Order the 
players by their economic relevance (i.e. ji PPji >< ⇔ , ( Nji ∈, )). Take iP  as i ’s expected 
marginal contribution to any coalition and define the average economic game as follows: 
ii PS ≡∆ )(γ           (6) 
Corollary 6 below characterizes the selection probabilities in the RSVR . 
Corollary 6 If the RSVR  is such that  
( ) ( )
⎩⎨
⎧
⋅
−−⋅ +
nmPm
nmPPm
PP
m
mm
n
m
=for  
11,..,=for  
=),..,(Pr 11υ
   
 (7) 
the expected political distortions are zero. 
 
The idea is simple. In a constitutional perspective economic relevance captures how a player 
will contribute on average. No political distortion occurs on average if random selection is 
based on economic relevance as specified by (7). 
6. An application: the Governing Council of the ECB 
A voting mechanism based on voters’ rotation has been adopted in 2002 for the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank.12 We consider it here because this mechanism is, in 
principle, quite similar to the RSVR . In this Section we measure the political distortion 
generated by the rotation method and we compute the optimal RSVR  for the Governing 
Council.13 
Under the rotation scheme the members of the EU monetary Union are split in three groups, 
based on the size of their economies. Assuming that all the 27 EU members have adopted the 
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single currency, the big countries’ group is made by the largest five countries. Based on one-
month rotation speed, only four of their Governors have vote right in the Council, then the 
permanence rate is 4/5 . The mid-sized countries’ group is composed by 14 countries; eight of 
them are admitted (perm. rate: 8/14 ). The small countries’ group is made of 8  countries, of 
which three are admitted (perm. rate: 3/8 ). The six members of the Executive Board have a 
permanent sit. 
In order to quantify political distortions we have to compute political power. We build the 
rotation voting game, Rv , as follows. There are 15  governors voting with one vote each. A not 
totally unrealistic hypothesis is that governors vote in the interest of their home countries.14 We 
assume that the six permanent members of the Executive Board always vote together. Therefore 
there is a th16  voter who has got 6  votes. The majority threshold is 11 votes. The SS  indices 
in this game are 0.375 for the Executive Board and 0.042  for each voting governor. Since 
governors do not always vote, in order to compute their actual political power we must multiply 
0.417  by their permanence rate. In Table 1 we normalized to one the governors’ power in 
order to have a better idea of how payoffs are split.15 Column 3  lists this computation of the 
countries’ normalized political power. 
Country ranking within the rotation system is based on a composite indicator built on two 
parameters: the country’s GDP (weighted 5/6), and the country’s share of the total IMF 
aggregated balance sheet. We use this indicator also as a measure iP  of economic relevance. 
Then we build the expected economic game, γ , using identities (6). With this framework, each 
country’s Shapley value is given by its own measure of economic relevance, as listed in column 
4 of Table 1. 
Consistent political distortions are expected to occur with the rotation mechanism. Despite 
the six most economically relevant countries may cast their votes more frequently, their political 
power is systematically lower than their economic power. The rotation mechanism is not able to 
prevent the occurrence of a huge aggregate political distortion: total transfers from the first six 
members to the remaining 21 amount to 45.28%  of total aggregate payoffs. 
As we know a Random Selection Rule may solve this problem. Given the measures of 
economic relevance (col. 4), formula (7) allows for computing the countries’ admission 
chances, in a random selection game that we call RSv . These chances are listed in columns 6 
and 7. They should be read as follows: “Germany has 4.45%  probability of being the sole 
country voting; it has 3.86%  chance of voting together with France only; it has 8.37%  chance 
of being together with France and UK only,... France has 3.86%  chance of voting with 
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Germany only; 8.37%  of being together with Germany and UK only...”. An alternative way to 
read this system, that refers to col. 6, is: “Germany should vote 100%  of times; France should 
vote 95.55% of times; UK should vote 92.49% of times...”. 
Ideally, the group of governors that vote in the Governing Council may be actually selected 
by drawing a ball from a box which contains a large number of balls. 4.45%  of these balls are 
marked “Germany”, meaning that if that kind of ball is drawn, only Germany will have voting 
right. 3.86%  of the balls are marked “Germany and France”. 8.37%  of balls are marked 
“Germany, France and UK”... 
With this voting method no political distortion occurs: political payoffs equal economic 
payoffs. 
 
Table 1: Political Distortions in the ECB Governing Council. 
ECB
Rotation Rule Random Selection Rule
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8
Country Perm. Rate Polit. power Econ. power Distortion Sel. chance Δ Sel. chance Distortion
frequencies  iv R  i̄ PDiv R , ̄ frequencies % PDiv RS , ̄
Germany 4/5 5.33 20.40 -15.07 100 4.45 0
France 4/5 5.33 15.95 -10.62 95.55 3.86 0
UK 4/5 5.33 14.42 -9.09 92.49 8.37 0
Italy 4/5 5.33 11.63 -6.30 84.12 11.24 0
Spain 4/5 5.33 8.82 -3.49 72.88 21.50 0
Netherlands 8/14 3.81 4.52 -0.71 51.38 9.12 0
Poland 8/14 3.81 3.00 0.81 42.26 2.38 0
Sweden 8/14 3.81 2.66 1.15 39.88 0.80 0
Belgium 8/14 3.81 2.56 1.25 39.08 1.62 0
Austria 8/14 3.81 2.38 1.43 37.46 2.40 0
Greece 8/14 3.81 2.14 1.67 35.06 2.86 0
Denmark 8/14 3.81 1.88 1.93 32.20 5.04 0
Portugal 8/14 3.81 1.46 2.35 27.16 0.13 0
Finland 8/14 3.81 1.45 2.36 27.03 0.14 0
Ireland 8/14 3.81 1.44 2.37 26.89 4.65 0
Czech Rep. 8/14 3.81 1.13 2.68 22.24 0.16 0
Romania 8/14 3.81 1.12 2.69 22.08 3.40 0
Hungary 8/14 3.81 0.92 2.89 18.68 7.56 0
Slovakia 8/14 3.81 0.50 3.31 11.12 3.23 0
Bulgaria 3/8 2.50 0.33 2.17 7.89 0.40 0
Luxembourg 3/8 2.50 0.31 2.19 7.49 0.21 0
Slovenia 3/8 2.50 0.30 2.20 7.28 2.20 0
Lithuania 3/8 2.50 0.20 2.30 5.08 0.46 0
Cyprus 3/8 2.50 0.18 2.32 4.62 0.96 0
Latvia 3/8 2.50 0.14 2.36 3.66 0.75 0
Estonia 3/8 2.50 0.11 2.39 2.91 1.56 0
Malta 3/8 2.50 0.05 2.45 1.35 1.35 0  
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7. Conclusions 
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, on the positive side, we show that in a large 
mass of cases voting weights are not sufficient to balance economic with political power. 
Second, on the normative side, we propose an alternative method based on random selection 
of voting rights. Partners are selected for voting according to a precise probability distribution, 
with the chance of voting in a small group and getting a lot, but also the risk of not voting at all 
and getting zero. Of course, more economically relevant partners must have higher chance to be 
selected. The probability distribution may be set up such that political power equals economic 
power. We argue that a rational risk-neutral agent would be indifferent between playing this 
kind of voting game and accepting a sure payment which amounts to the monetary equivalent of 
his economic power. 
This paper suggests that the ancestral “democratic” principle of granting all members a 
permanent right to vote may lead in the long run to enormous amount of undesired wealth 
redistribution among partners. Methods with rotating members, like the ones adopted by the 
ECB or the UN Security Council, may reduce but not completely counteract political 
distortions. 
This paper also suggests that the political distortion is crucially determined by the nature of 
the political pact. Distortions are lower when partners have the chance to break the pact (e.g. 
seceding, leaving a federation, withdrawing from a joint venture,...). Eventually, this can be 
done at a cost. We find that when this cost is zero, no political distortion occurs and the political 
bargaining subsumes perfectly the underlying economic bargaining. In other words, including a 
secession clause or a breakdown scenario among the constitutional or statutory provisions 
reduces distortions substantially. 
Finally some caveats. First, risk neutrality may not be the most appropriate way to look at 
preferences over political issues, and in many cases side-payments may not be feasible. 
Unfortunately removing quasi-linear preferences would imply a critical departure from this 
approach. Second, the use of partition functions instead of characteristic functions might 
improve the analysis of coalition formation in economic games with outside options. Third, in 
this paper we have considered only a quite simplified voting scheme: direct voting in 
committees or unicameral representative democracies, in which the representatives of the same 
district always vote together. 
Realistically voting schemes may be more complex, allowing for bicameralism, procedural 
provisions, check and balances, vetoes... Some of these aspects can be managed without 
abandoning the coalitional game approach of this paper. For example, appropriate coalition 
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structures or compound games may be used. This might suggest interesting extensions of our 
work. 
Appendix 
Proposition 1. 
Proof. i) Consider a game Γ∈),( γN . Without loss of generality, let 1=)(Nγ . Let us call 
{ }iNSSD ii \:)(=)( ⊆∆ γγ  the vector of i ’s marginal contributions to all the other players’ 
coalitions, with )(Siγ∆  defined as in (1). Given the convexity of game γ  (see Section 3 and 
footnote 4), )(γiD  is a vector in the 12 −n -dimensional unit-cube. Let P  be the 12 −n -
dimensional vector of the coalition probabilities assigned by the Shapley solution in (1): 
{ }iNSSpP \:)(= ⊆ , and { }Γ∈),(:)(= γγ NDiiD  be the set of all vectors of i ’s marginal 
contributions in games of Γ . It is easy to see that iD  is the unit-cube in 1−ℜn  and is a convex 
set, i.e. given any two points )( 0γiD , )( 1γiD , with ),( 0γN , Γ∈),( 1γN , it is always possible 
to find a game Γ∈),( 2γN  such that iiii DtDtD D∈+− )()()(1=)( 102 γγγ  for any [ ]0,1∈t . 
By definition, PDii ⋅)(=)( γγϕ , which means that player i ’s Shapley value is a linear 
transformation of )(γiD . If { }Γ∈Ψ ),(:)(= γγϕ Nii  denotes the space of all player i ’s 
percentage Shapley values, then we can write Pii ⋅Ψ D= , that is iΨ  is a linear continuous 
transformation of iD  in ℜ . Since iD  is convex, then also iΨ  is convex. Namely, [ ]0,1=iΨ , 
which is a closed subset of the real numbers, and therefore is dense in ℜ . 
ii) Now, let us call { }Σ∈Σ ),(:)(=)( vNvDiiD  the set of i ’s marginal contributions in all 
the simple games. The elements of any )()( Σ∈ ii vD D  are only either 0  or 1, therefore )(ΣiD  
is a non-convex subset of 1−ℜn . Correspondingly, { }Σ∈ΣΨ ),(:)(=)( vNvii φ  is the space of 
all player i ’s SS  values, with )(viφ  defined by (2), therefore Pii ⋅ΣΣΨ )(=)( D . Of course, 
)(ΣΨi  is a continuous transformation of )(ΣiD , but )(ΣiD  is not convex, so )(ΣΨi  is a non-
dense subset of [ ]0,1=iΨ . ■ 
Liuc Paper n.261, dicembre 2012 
 22 
Proposition 2. 
Proof. Take )(Sp  in the definition 2 of political value. Recall that 
!
1)!(!=)(
n
snsSp −− . Call 
)(nΠ  the set of all possible values of )(Sp . Notice that )(nΠ  is coarse if n  is small, but, as 
n  increases, it becomes more and more populated. In the limit, )(nΠ  coincides with the unit 
interval. Observe that in this case political solutions can be viewed as weighted sums of all 
elements in )(nΠ  in which the weights can only be integers from zero to n2  (see definition 2 
and footnote 7). If ∞→n , then [ ]0,1)( →Π n  and any point in [ ]0,1  can be a solution of a 
political game; i.e. it can be such a weighted sum of the points in [ ]0,1=)(nΠ . ■ 
Proposition 3. 
Proof. Let v  be a political (weighted voting) game, and let αv  be the same voting game in 
which partners have the option of leaving the union if they pay a “fine” which is a share )(1 α−  
of their option’s payoffs (see example 2). Let us re-write the political distortion in definition 1 
as: 
[ ] [ ]{ })()()()()(=),(
\
SvSiSiSvSpvPD
iNS
i −+∪−∪⋅∑
⊆
γγγ
 
[ ] [ ]{ })()()()()(=),(
\
SvSiSiSvSpvPD
iNS
i
ααα γγγ −+∪−∪⋅∑
⊆  
We may have three cases. Let us see how ),( γαvPDi  changes with respect to ),( γvPDi . 
• First, observe that any player has an incentive to leave the union if S  is a minority. In 
this case, 0=)( iSv ∪  and 0=)(Sv . Leaving the union and joining the minority S  
yields )(=)( iSiSv ∪∪ αγα  and )(=)( SSv αγ . Both squared brackets in the LHS 
of ),( γαvPDi  can only decrease in absolute value and approach zero with 1→α . 
• Second, if i  is the pivot in S , then 1=)( iSv ∪  and 0=)(Sv . In game αv , the 
payoffs are: )\()(1)(=)( iSNiSiSv ∪−−∪∪ γαγα  and 0=)(Svα . The first 
squared brackets in the LHS of ),( γαvPDi  can only decrease in absolute value and 
approaches zero with 1→α . 
• Third, if S  is a majority, 1=)( iSv ∪  and 1=)(Sv . In game αv , payoffs are: 
)\()(1)(=)( iSNiSiSv ∪−−∪∪ γαγα  and 
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)\()(1)(=)( iSNiSSv ∪−−∪ γαγα . Both squared brackets in the LHS of 
),( γαvPDi  can only decrease in absolute value and approach zero with 1→α . 
Thus,  
0<),(α
γα
∂
∂ vPDi
 
0=),(lim
1
γαα vPDi→   
■ 
Proposition 4. 
Proof. By (2), no expected political distortion occurs if the )(γmx ’s solve the following 
system of linear equations ( nm 1,..,= ): 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
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++
+++⋅
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)(=)(1)(
2
1
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where equation m  is the expected SS  of player m . For any γ , this system admits a unique 
solution,  
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as for the generic )(γmx  this solution is equation (5). ■ 
Proposition 5. 
Proof. Let )(γRp  be the random selection voting rule for ),( γN . Specifically, )(γRp  is a 
probability distribution over the set of mv  such that ( ))(Pr=))(( γυγ mmR vp  as defined in (5). 
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 For any player i , the average political distortion is: 
[ ])())((1=),(
1=
ji
R
i
t
j
j
R
i p
t
pPD γϕγφγ −∑
 
Observe that for any i , 
)(=)(1
1=
γϕγϕ iji
t
jt
∑
 
and 
.0=),( γRi pPD  
Therefore,  
0.=)())((1=),(
1=
γϕγφγ iRi
t
j
j
R
i p
t
pPD −∑
 ■ 
Corollary 6. 
Proof. Observe that if ii PS ≡∆ )(γ , for any NS ⊂ , and any i , then ii P=)(γϕ , for any i . 
Applying propositions 4 and 5 completes the proof. ■  
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Notes 
 
1 Myerson (1980) shows that the Shapley’s allocation rule guarantees fairness in political payoffs 
division, while van den Brink (2002) demonstrates that any solution which satisfies symmetry and 
additivity, and this is the case, also satisfies fairness. 
2 Recent applications of power indices to decision-making in the European Union have stimulated a broad 
literature (an incomplete list includes Baldwin & Widgrén, 2004; Felsenthal & Machover, 2004; 
Napel & Widgrén, 2006, 2011; Braham & Holler, 2005; Laruelle & Valenciano, 2008b; Passarelli & 
Barr, 2007; Barr & Passarelli, 2009; Benati & Vittucci Marzetti, 2012) and a lively debate with some 
skeptical view (Garrett & Tsebelis, 1999). 
3 Although the Shapley value is framed in the cooperative approach to the bargaining problem, there are 
in the literature several examples of non-cooperative (extensive form) games that yield the Shapley 
value. See for instance Gul (1989), Hart & Mas-Colell (1996), Maskin (2003). These games represent 
credible descriptions of what happens in a purely economic environment (e.g. a market) as well as in a 
political environment (e.g. a legislature). Recently, Laruelle & Valenciano (2007, 2008a, 2009) 
explore both the non-cooperative foundations and the axiomatic properties of the SS as a measure of 
bargaining power. 
4 A game is convex if its characteristic function γ  is supermodular: 
,,),()()()( NTSTSTSTS ⊆∀+≥∩+∪ γγγγ  or equivalently: 
{} {} {} NiiNTSTiTSiS ∈∀⊆⊆∀−∪≤−∪ ,\),()()()( γγγγ . Supermodularity trivially implies 
superadditivity, therefore a convex game is superadditive too. 
5 Although distributional provisions, such as taxation or subsidies, are frequent in legislation, the 
assumption that the law includes those provisions is redundant in our analysis. In TU games the 
presence of a medium of payment allows the players to share γ(N) even without specific law 
provisions. What allows the legislative bargaining to replace the economic one is specifically the fact 
that γ(N) cannot be produced without the political decision. Note that v(N) does not imply that all 
players are in the majority. It rather means that the majority decision has been reached, and that 
decision is enforced to the minority too. 
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6 This is also what happens in non-political contexts, such as companies, organizations, condiminiums,... 
7 Let us see why the set of all SS  solutions with three players consists of these six points. Recall that 
)(Sp  in (2) is 
!
1)!(!
n
sns −− . Observe that, with three players, )(Sp  can only have two values: 1/3 and 
1/6. Political payoffs can only be given by weighted sums of these two values, where weights can 
only be integers from 0 to 2. It is easy to verify that there is no allocation of votes such that 
6/5=)(⋅iφ .  
Thus  ⋅⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ΣΨ ,1
3
2,
2
1,
3
1,
6
10,=)(i  
8 In a sense, α parametrizes the level of centralization of the political group. If α = 0, there is no 
centralization: players bear no cost if they leave the group; their outside option is fully available. If α 
= 1, there is perfect centralization: players cannot abandon the political union and get a positive 
payoff. 
9 Any country which breaks the public deficit target has to refund the other members with a fine that is 
proportional to its GDP. 
10 For instance, one may think that politically weak but economically strong partners feel entitled to 
higher payoffs. Their sense of aggrievement leads them to destroy the others’ payoffs through a war. 
This is a Pareto suboptimal mechanims and the resulting political game does not satisfy 
superadditivity. The outcome is the brakdown of the union. 
11 Observe that with the RSVR individuals are given a lottery “over simple majority games”. Requiring 
that for all i the solution of the RSVR equals )(γϕi  implies that any player is neutral to what Roth calls 
“ordinary risk” (Roth, 1988a, pp. 57-58). Laruelle & Valenciano (2003) provide further insights on 
the ordinary risk neutrality involved here. The reader may notice that the result in proposition 4 
derives from the idea that any payoff vector can be obtained as a linear combination of games whose 
solutions are equal divisions amongst participants. 
12 On December 2008 the ECB decided to postpone the introduction of the rotation system until the 
number of Governors and Presidents of the euro area national central banks (Governors) exceeds 18. 
13 Recently a power analysis of the new rotation system has been carried on by Belke & von Schnurbein 
(2012). They provide measurements for both traditional SS indices and preference-based indices. 
14 By contrast, if this was not the case, there would be no need of any rotation system. 
15 The idea behind normalization is that, differently from countries, the Executive Board does not enjoy 
any economic benefits from participating in voting. 
